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Abstract
Software-defined networking (SDN) is a novel paradigm that out-sources the control of
packet-forwarding switches to a set of software controllers. The most fundamental task of
these controllers is the correct implementation of the network policy, i.e., the intended network
behavior. In essence, such a policy specifies the rules by which packets must be forwarded across
the network.
This paper studies a distributed SDN control plane that enables concurrent and robust policy
implementation. We introduce a formal model describing the interaction between the data plane
and a distributed control plane (consisting of a collection of fault-prone controllers). Then we
formulate the problem of consistent composition of concurrent network policy updates (short:
the CPC Problem). To anticipate scenarios in which some conflicting policy updates must be
rejected, we enable the composition via a natural transactional interface with all-or-nothing
semantics.
We show that the ability of an f -resilient distributed control plane to process concurrent
policy updates depends on the tag complexity, i.e., the number of policy labels (a.k.a. tags)
available to the controllers, and describe a CPC protocol with optimal tag complexity f + 2.
1 Introduction
The emerging paradigm of Software-Defined Networking (SDN) promises to simplify network
management and enable building networks that meet specific, end-to-end requirements. In SDN,
the control plane (a collection of network-attached servers) maintains control over the so-called
data plane (the packet-forwarding functionality implemented on switching hardware). Control
applications operate on a global, logically-centralized network view, which introduces opportunities
for network-wide management and optimization. This view enables simplified programming models
to define a high-level network policy, i.e., the intended operational behavior of the network encoded
as a collection of forwarding rules that the data plane must respect.
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While the notion of centralized control lies at the heart of SDN, implementing it on a centralized
controller does not provide the required levels of availability, responsiveness and scalability. How to
realize a robust, distributed control plane is one of the main open problems in SDN and to solve it
we must deal with fundamental trade-offs between different consistency models, system availability
and performance. Implementing a resilient control plane becomes therefore a distributed-computing
problem that requires reasoning about interactions and concurrency between the controllers while
preserving correct operation of the data plane.
In this paper, as a case study, we consider the problem of consistent installation of network-
policy updates (i.e., collections of state modifications spanning one or more switches), one of the
main tasks any network control plane must support. We consider a multi-authorship setting [8]
where multiple administrators, control applications, or end-host applications may want to modify
the network policy independently at the same time, and where a conflict-free installation must be
found.
We assume that we are provided with a procedure to assemble sequentially arriving policy
updates in one (semantically sound) composed policy (e.g., using the formalism of [1]). Therefore,
we address here the challenge of composing concurrent updates, while preserving a property known
as per-packet consistency [18]. Informally, we must guarantee that every packet traversing the
network must be processed by exactly one global network policy, even throughout the interval
during which the policy is updated — in this case, each packet is processed either using the policy
in place prior to the update, or the policy in place after the update completes, but never a mixture
of the two. At the same time, we need to resolve conflicts among policy updates that cannot be
composed in a sequential execution. We do this by allowing some of the requests to be rejected,
but requiring that no data packet is affected by a rejected update.
Our first contribution is a formal model of SDN under fault-prone, concurrent control. We
then focus on the problem of per-packet consistent updates [18], and introduce the abstraction
of Consistent Policy Composition (CPC), which offers a transactional interface to address the
issue of conflicting policy updates. We believe that the CPC abstraction, inspired by the popular
paradigm of software transactional memory (STM) [19], exactly matches the desired behavior from
the network operator’s perspective, since it captures the intuition of a correct sequential composition
combined with optimistic application of policy updates.
We then discuss different protocols to solve the CPC problem. We present a wait-free CPC
algorithm, called FixTag, which allows the controllers to directly apply their updates on the data
plane and resolve conflicts as they progress installing the updates. While FixTag tolerates any
number of faulty controllers and does not require them to be strongly synchronized (thus improving
concurrency of updates), it incurs a linear tag complexity in the number of to-be-installed policies
(and hence in the worst-case exponential in the network size). We then present a more sophisticated
protocol called ReuseTag, which applies the replicated state-machine approach to implement a
total order on to-be-installed policy updates. Assuming that at most f controllers can fail, we show
that ReuseTag achieves an optimal tag complexity f + 2.
To the best of our knowledge, this work initiates an analytical study of a distributed and fault-
tolerant SDN control plane. We keep our model intentionally simple and we focus on a restricted
class of forwarding policies, which was sufficient to highlight intriguing connections between our
SDN model and conventional distributed-computing models, in particular, STM [19]. One can
view the SDN data plane as a shared-memory data structure, and the controllers can be seen as
read/write processes, modifying the forwarding rules applied to packets at each switch. The traces
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of packets constituting the data-plane workload can be seen as “read-only” transactions, reading
the forwarding rules at a certain switch in order to “decide” which switch state to read next.
Interestingly, since in-flight packets cannot be dropped (if it is not intended to do so) or delayed,
these read-only transactions must always commit, in contrast with policy update transactions.
In general, we believe that our work can inform the networking community about what can and
cannot be achieved in a distributed control plane. We also derive a minimal requirement on the SDN
model without which CPC is impossible to solve. From the distributed-computing perspective, we
show that the SDN model exhibits concurrency phenomena not yet observed in classical distributed
systems. For example, even if the controllers can synchronize their actions using consensus [10],
complex interleavings between the controllers’ actions and packet-processing events prevent them
from implementing CPC with constant tag complexity (achievable using one reliable controller).
Roadmap. We introduce our SDN model in Section 2. Section 3 formulates the CPC problem
and Section 4 describes our CPC solutions and their complexity bounds. We discuss related work
in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6. Proof sketches are given in the Appendix.
2 Distributed Control Plane Model
We consider a setting where different users (i.e., policy authors or administrators) can issue
policy update requests to the distributed SDN control plane. We now introduce our SDN model
as well as the policy concept in more detail.
Control plane. The distributed control plane is modelled as a set of n ≥ 2 controllers, p1, . . . , pn.
The controllers are subject to crash failures: a faulty controller stops taking steps of its algorithm.
The controller that never crashes is called correct and we assume that there is at least one correct
controller. We assume that controllers can communicate among themselves (e.g., through an out-
of-band management network) in a reliable but asynchronous (and not necessarily FIFO) fashion,
using message-passing. Moreover, the controllers have access to a consensus abstraction [9] that
allows them to implement, in a fault-tolerant manner, any replicated state machine, provided
its sequential specification [10]. The consensus abstraction can be obtained, e.g., assuming the
eventually synchronous communication [7] or the eventual leader Ω failure detector [5] shared by
the controllers, assuming a majority of correct controllers or the quorum failure detector Σ [6].
Data plane. Following [18], we model the network data plane as a set P of ports and a set
L ⊆ P × P of directed links. As in [18], a hardware switch is represented as a set of ports, and
a physical bi-directional link between two switches A and B is represented as a set of directional
links, where each port of A is connected to the port of B facing A and every port of B is connected
to the port of A facing B. We additionally assume that P contains two distinct ports, World and
Drop, which represent forwarding a packet to the outside of the network (e.g., to an end-host or
upstream provider) and dropping the packet, respectively. A port i /∈ {World,Drop} that has no
incoming links, i.e., @j ∈ P : (j, i) ∈ L is called ingress, otherwise the port is called internal.
Every internal port is connected to Drop (can drop packets). A subset of ports are connected to
Drop (can forward packets to the outside of the network). World and Drop have no outgoing links:
∀i ∈ {World,Drop}, @j ∈ P : (i, j) ∈ L.
The workload on the data plane consists of a set Π of packets. (To distinguish control-plane from
data-plane communication, we reserve the term message for a communication involving at least one
controller.) In general, we will use the term packet canonically as a type [18], e.g., describing all
packets (the packet instances or copies) matching a certain header; when clear from the context,
we do not explicitly distinguish between packet types and packet instances.
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Port queues and switch functions. The state of the network is characterized by a port queue
Qi and a switch function Si associated with every port i. A port queue Qi is a sequence of packets
that are, intuitively, waiting to be processed at port i. A switch function is a map Si : Π→ Π×P ,
that, intuitively, defines how packets in the port queue Qi are to be processed. When a packet
pk is fetched from port queue Qi, the corresponding located packet, i.e., a pair (pk
′, j) = Si(pk) is
computed and the packet pk′ is placed to the queue Qj .
We represent the switch function at port i, Si, as a collection of rules. Here a rule r is a partial
map r : Π→ Π× P that, for each packet pk in its domain dom(r), generates a new located packet
r(pk) = (pk′, j), which results in pk′ put in queue Qj such that (i, j) ∈ L. Disambiguation between
rules that have overlapping domains is achieved through priority levels, as discussed below.
We assume that only a part of a packet pk can be modified by a rule: namely, a header field
called the tag that carries the information that is used to identify which rules apply to a given
packet.
Port operations. We assume that a port supports an atomic execution of a read, modify-rule
and write operation: the rules of a port can be atomically read and, depending on the read rules,
modified and written back to the port. Formally, a port i supports the operation: update(i, g),
where g is a function defined on the sets of rules. The operation atomically reads the state of the
port, and then, depending on the state, uses g to update it and return a response. For example, g
may involve adding a new forwarding rule or a rule that puts a new tag τ into the headers of all
incoming packets.
Policies and policy composition. Finally we are ready to define the fundamental notion of
network policy. A policy pi is defined by a domain dom(pi) ⊆ Π, a priority level pr(pi) ∈ N, and
a unique forwarding path, i.e., a loop-free sequence of piecewise connected ports, for each ingress
port that should apply to the packets in its domain dom(pi). Formally, for each ingress port i and
each packet pk ∈ dom(pi) arriving at port i, pi specifies a sequence of distinct ports i1, . . . , is that
pk should follow, where i1 = i, ∀j = 1, . . . , s − 1, (ij , ij+1) ∈ L and is ∈ {World,Drop}. The last
condition means that each packet following the path eventually leaves the network or is dropped.
We call two policies pi and pi′ independent if dom(pi) ∩ dom(pi′) = ∅. Two policies pi and pi′
conflict if they are not independent and pr(pi) = pr(pi′). Now a set U of policies is conflict-free
if no two policies in U conflict. Intuitively, the priority levels are used to establish the order
among non-conflicting policies with overlapping domains: a packet pk ∈ dom(pi) ∩ dom(pi′), where
pr(pi) > pr(pi′), is processed by policy pi. Conflict-free policies in a set U can therefore be composed :
a packet arriving at a port is applied the highest priority policy pi ∈ U such that pk ∈ dom(pi).
Modelling traffic. The traffic workload on our system is modelled using inject and forward events
defined as follows:
• inject(pk, j): the environment injects a packet pk to an ingress port j by adding pk to the
end of queue Qj , i.e., replacing Qj with Qj · pk.
• forward(pk, j, pk′, k), j ∈ P : the first packet in Qj is processed according to Sj , i.e., if
Qj = pk.Q
′, thenQj is replaced withQ′ andQk is replaced withQk·pk′, where r(pk) = (pk′, k)
and r is the highest-priority rule in Sj that can be applied to pk.
Algorithms, histories, and problems. Each controller pi is assigned with an algorithm, i.e., a
state machine that (i) accepts invocations of high-level operations, (ii) accesses ports with read-
modify-write operations, (iii) communicates with other controllers, and (iv) produces high-level
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responses. The distributed algorithm generates a sequence of executions consisting of port accesses,
invocations, responses, and packet forward events. Given an execution of an algorithm, a history is
the sequence of externally observable events, i.e., inject and forward events, as well as invocations
and responses of controllers’ operations.
We assume an asynchronous fair scheduler and reliable communication channels between the
controllers: in every infinite execution, no message starves in a port queue without being served by
a forward event, and every message sent to a controller is eventually received.
A problem is a set P of histories. An algorithm solves a problem P if the history of its every
execution is in P. An algorithm solves P f -resiliently if the property above holds in every f -resilient
execution, i.e., in which at most f controllers take only finitely many steps. An (n − 1)-resilient
solution is sometimes called wait-free.
Traces and trace consistency. In a history H, every packet injected to the network generates
a trace, i.e., a sequence of located packets: each event ev = inject(pk, j) in E results in (pk, j) as
the first element of the sequence, forward(pk, j, pk1, k1) adds (pk1, j1) to the trace, and each next
forward(pkk, jk, pkk+1, jk+1) extends the trace with (pkk+1, jk+1), unless jk ∈ {textsfDrop,World}
in which case we say that the trace terminates. Note that in a finite network an infinite trace
must contain a cycle. Let ρev,H denote the trace corresponding to an inject event ev = inject(pk, j)
a history H. Trace ρ = (pk1, i1), (pk2, i2), . . . is consistent with a policy pi if pk1 ∈ dom(pi) and
(i1, , i2, . . .) ∈ pi.
Tag complexity. It turns out that what can and what cannot be achieved by a distributed control
plane depends on the number of available tags, used by control protocols to distinguish packets that
should be processed by different policies. Throughout this paper, we will refer to the number of
different tags used by a protocol as the tag complexity. W.l.o.g., we will typically assume that tags
are integers {0, 1, 2, . . .}, and our protocols seek to choose low tags first; thus, the tag complexity
is usually the largest used tag number x, throughout the entire (possibly infinite) execution of the
protocol and in the worst case. Observe that a protocol of tag complexity x requires blog xc + 1
bits in the packet header.
Monitoring oracle. In order to be able to reuse tags, the control plane needs some feedback
from the network about the active policies, i.e., for which policies there are still packets in transit.
We use an oracle model in this paper: each controller can query the oracle to learn about the
tags currently in use by packets in any queue. Our assumptions on the oracle are minimal, and
oracle interactions can be asynchronous. In practice, the available tags can simply be estimated by
assuming a rough upper bound on the transit time of packets through the network.
3 The CPC Problem
Now we formulate our problem statement. At a high level, the CPC abstraction of consistent
policy composition accepts concurrent policy-update requests and makes sure that the requests
affect the traffic as a sequential composition of their policies. The abstraction offers a transactional
interface where requests can be committed or aborted. Intuitively, once a request commits, the
corresponding policy affects every packet in its domain that is subsequently injected. But in case
it cannot be composed with the currently installed policy, it is aborted and does not affect a
single packet. On the progress side, we require that if a set of policies conflict, at least one policy
is successfully installed. Recall that inject and forward events are not under our control, i.e.,
the packets cannot be delayed, e.g., until a certain policy is installed. Therefore, a packet trace
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that interleaves with a policy update must be consistent with the policy before the update or the
policy after the update (and not some partial policy), the property is referred to as per-packet
consistency [18]).
CPC Interface. Formally, every controller pi accepts requests applyi(pi), where pi is a policy, and
returns acki (the request is committed) or nacki (the request is aborted).
We specify a partial order relation on the events in a history H, denoted <H . We say that a
request req precedes a request req′ in a history H, and we write req <H req′, if the response of req
appears before the invocation of req′ in H. If none of the requests precedes the other, we say that
the requests are concurrent. Similarly, we say that an inject event ev precedes (resp., succeeds) a
request req in H, and we write ev <H req (resp., req <H ev), if ev appears after the response (resp.,
before the invocation) of req in H. Two inject events ev and ev′ on the same port in H are related
by ev <H ev
′ if ev precedes ev′ in H.
An inject event ev is concurrent with req if ev 6<H req and req 6<H ev. A history H is sequential
if in H, no two requests are concurrent and no inject event is concurrent with a request.
Let H|pi denote the local history of controller pi, i.e., the subsequence of H consisting of all
events of pi. We assume that every controller is well-formed : every local history H|pi is sequential,
i.e., no controller accepts a new request before producing a response to the previous one. A request
issued by pi is complete in H if it is followed by a matching response (acki or nacki) in H|pi
(otherwise it is called incomplete). A history is complete if every request is complete in H. A
completion of a history H is a complete history H ′ which is like H except that each incomplete
request in H is completed with ack (intuitively, this is necessary if the request already affected
packets) or nack inserted somewhere after its invocation. Two histories H and H ′ are equivalent if
H and H ′ have the same sets of events, for all pi, H|pi = H ′|pi, and for all inject events ev in H
and H ′, ρev,H = ρev,H′ .
Sequentially composable histories. A sequential complete history H is legal if the following
two properties are satisfied: (1) a policy is committed in H if and only if it does not conflict with
the set of policies previously committed in H, and (2) for every inject event ev = inject(pk, j) in
H, the trace ρev,H is consistent with the composition of all committed policies that precede ev in
H.
Definition 1 (Sequentially composable history) We say that a complete history H is sequen-
tially composable if there exists a legal sequential history S such that (1) H and S are equivalent,
and (2) <H⊆<S.
Intuitively, Definition 1 implies that the traffic in H is processed as if the requests were applied
atomically and every injected packet is processed instantaneously (per-packet consistency). The
legality property here requires that only committed requests affect the traffic. Moreover, the equiv-
alent sequential history S must respect the order in which non-concurrent requests take place and
packets arrive in H.
Definition 2 (CPC) We say that an algorithm solves the problem of Consistent Policy Compo-
sition (CPC) if for its every history H, there exists a completion H ′ such that:
Consistency. H ′ is sequentially composable.
Termination. If H is infinite, then every correct controller pi that accepts a requests applyi(pi),
eventually returns (acki or nacki) in H.
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[ ]
[ ]
apply(π1)
apply(π2) ack
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Time
=~
(b)
Figure 1: Example of a policy composition with a 3-controller control plane and 3-switch data plane (a).
The three controllers try to concurrently install three different policies pi1, pi2, and pi3. We suppose that
pi3 is conflicting with both pi1 and pi2, so pi3 is aborted (b). Circles represent data-plane events (an inject
event followed by a sequence of forward events). Next to H we depict its “sequential equivalent” HS . In the
sequential history, no two requests are applied concurrently and no request is rejected.
Note that, for an infinite history H, the Consistency and Termination requirements imply that
an incomplete request in H can only cause aborts of conflicting requests for a finite period of time:
eventually it would abort or commit in a completion of H and if it aborts, then no subsequent
conflicting requests will be affected. As a result we provide an all-or-nothing semantics: a policy
update, regardless of the behavior of the controller that installs it, either eventually takes effect or
does not affect a single packet. Figure 1 gives an example of a sequentially composable history.
4 CPC Solutions and Complexity Bounds
We now discuss how the CPC problem can be solved and analyze the complexity its solutions
incur. We begin with a simple wait-free algorithm FixTag which implicitly orders policies at a
given ingress port; FixTag incurs a linear tag complexity in the number of to-be-installed policies.
Then we present an f -resilient algorithm ReuseTag with tag complexity f + 2. We also show that
ReuseTag is optimal, i.e., no protocol can maintain smaller tags for all networks.
4.1 FixTag: Per-Policy Tags
The basic idea of FixTag is to encode each possible forwarding path in the network by its own
tag. Let τk be the tag representing the k
th possible path. FixTag assumes that, initially, for each
internal port ix which lies on the k
th path, a rule rτk(pk) = (pk, ix+1) is installed, which forwards
any packet tagged τk and forwards the corresponding packet to the path’s successive port ix+1.
Upon receiving a new policy request pi and before installing any rules, a controller pi executing
FixTag sends a message to all other controllers informing them about the rules it intends to add
to the ingress ports; every controller receiving this message rebroadcasts it (making the broadcast
reliable), and starts installing the policy on pi’s behalf. This ensures that every policy update
that started affecting the traffic eventually completes. Let i1, . . . , is be the set of ingress port,
and pij be the path specified by policy pi for ingress port ij , j = 1, . . . , s. To install pi, FixTag
seeks to add a rule to each ingress port ij ; this rule tags all packets matching the policy domain
with the tag describing the path pij . However, since different policies from different controllers
may conflict, every controller updates the ingress ports in a pre-defined order. Thus, conflicts are
discovered already at the lowest-order port, and the conflict-free all-or-nothing installation of a
policy is ensured.
Observe that FixTag does not require any feedback from the network on when packets arrive
or leave the system. It just tags all traffic at the network edge; internally, the packets are only
forwarded according to these tags.
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We have the following theorem.
Theorem 3 FixTag solves the CPC problem in the wait-free manner, without relying on the oracle
and consensus objects.
However, while providing a correct network update even under high control plane concurrency and
failures, FixTag has a large tag complexity, namely linear in the number of to-be-installed policies
(which may grow to super-exponential in the network size). If we want to reduce the tag overhead,
we should be able to reuse tags that are not needed anymore.
4.2 ReuseTag: Optimal Tag Complexity
The ReuseTag protocol sketched in Figure 2 allows controllers to use up to f+2 tags dynamically
and in a coordinated fashion. As we will also show in this section, there does not exist any solution
with less than f + 2 tags. Note that in the fault-free scenario (f = 0), only one bit can be used for
storing the policy tag.
State machine. The protocol is built atop a replicated state machine (implemented, e.g., using the
construction of [10]) that imposes a global order on the policy updates and ensures a coordinated
use and reuse of the protocol tags. For simplicity, we assume that the policies in the updates are
uniquely identified.
The state machine we are going to use in our algorithm, and which we call PS (for Policy
Serialization) exports, to each controller pi, two operations:
• push(i, pi), where pi is a policy, that always returns ok;
• pull(i) that returns ⊥ or a tuple (pi, tag), where pi is a policy and tag ∈ {0, . . . , f + 1}.
Intuitively, pi invokes push(i, pi) to put policy pi in the queue of policies waiting to be installed;
and pi invokes pull(i) to fetch the next policy to be installed. The invocation of pull returns ⊥ if all
policies pushed so far are already installed and there is an “available” tag (to be explained below),
otherwise it returns a tuple (pi, tag), informing pi that policy pi should be equipped with tag.
Let S be a sequential execution of PS. Let pi1, pi2, . . . be the sequence of policies proposed in
S as arguments of the push() operations (in the order of appearance). Let (pii,1, τi,1), (pii,3, τi,2), . . .
be the sequence of non-⊥ responses to pull(i) operations in S (performed by pi). If S contains
exactly k non-trivial (returning non-⊥ values) pull(i) operations, then we say that pi performed k
non-trivial pulls in S. If S contains pull(i) that returns (pi, t) 6= ⊥, followed by a subsequent pull(i),
then we say that pi is installed in S.
We say that τk is blocked at the end of a finite history S if S contains pull(i) that returns
(pik+1, τk+1, 0) but does not contain a subsequent pull(i). In this case, we also say that pi blocks
tag τk at the end of S. Note that a controller installing policy pik+1 blocks the tag associated with
the previous policy pik (or the initially installed policy in case k = 0). Now we are ready to define
the sequential specification of PS via the following requirements on S:
• Non-triviality: If pi performed k non-trivial pulls, then a subsequent pull(i) returns ⊥ if and
only if the pull operation is preceded by at most k pushes or f + 1 or more policies are blocked in
S. In other words, the k-th pull of pi must return some policy if at least k policies were previously
pushed and at most f of them are blocked.
• Agreement: For all k > 0, there exists τk ∈ {0, . . . , f + 1} such that if controllers pi and pj
performed k nontrivial pulls, then pii,k = pij,k = pik and τi,k = τj,k = τk for some τk. Therefore,
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the controllers compute the same order in which the proposed policies must be installed, with the
same sequence of tags.
• Tag validity: For all k, τk is the minimal value in {0, . . . , f + 1}− {τk−1} that is not blocked in
{0, . . . , n− 1} when the first pull(i) operation that returns (pik, τk, rk) is performed. The intuition
here is that the tags are chosen deterministically based on all the tags that are not currently blocked.
Since, by the Non-triviality property, at most f policies are blocked in this case, {0, . . . , f + 1} −
{τk−1} is non-empty.
Initially:
seq := ⊥; curi := ⊥
upon apply(p˜i)
1 curi := p˜i
2 PS.push(i, p˜i)
do forever
3 wait until PS.pull(i) returns (pi, t) 6= ⊥
4 if (seq and pi conflict) then
5 res := nack
6 else
7 seq := seq.(pi, t)
8 wait until tag(|seq| − 1) is not used
9 install(seq)
10 res := ack
11 if pi = curi then return res; curi := ⊥
Figure 2: The ReuseTag algorithm: pseudocode
for controller pi.
In the following, we assume that a lineariz-
able f -resilient implementation of PS is avail-
able [12]: any concurrent history of the imple-
mentation is, in a precise sense, equivalent to
a sequential history that respects the temporal
relations on operations and every operation in-
voked by a correct controller returns, assuming
that at most f controllers fail. Note that the
PS machine establishes a total order on poli-
cies (pi1, tag1), (pi2, tag2), . . ., which we call the
composition order (the policy requests that do
not compose with a prefix of this order are ig-
nored).
Algorithm operation. The algorithm is de-
picted in Figure 2 and operates as follows. To
install policy p˜i, controller pi first pushes p˜i to
the policy queue by invoking PS.push(i, p˜i).
In parallel, to install its policy and help
the others, the controller runs the following
task (Lines 3-11). First it keeps invoking
PS.pull(i) until a (non-⊥) value (pik, τk) is re-
turned (Line 3); here k is the number of nontrivial pulls performed by pi so far. The controller
checks if pik is not conflicting with previously installed policies (Line 4), stored in sequence seq.
Otherwise, in Line 8, pi waits until the traffic in the network only carries tag τk−1 (the tag τk−2
used by the penultimate policy in seq, denoted tag(|seq| − 1)). Here pi uses the oracle (described
in Section 2) that produces the set of currently active policies.
Then the controller tries to install pik on all internal ports followed by the ingress ports, one by
one, in a pre-defined order, employing the “two-phase update” strategy of [18] (Line 9). The update
of an internal port p is performed using an atomic operation that adds the rule associated with pik
equipped with τk to the set of rules currently installed on p. The update on an ingress port p simply
replaces the currently installed rule with a new rule tagging the traffic with τk which succeeds if
and only if the port currently carries the policy tag τk−1 (otherwise, the port is left untouched).
Once all ingress ports are updated, old rules are removed, one by one, from the internal ports. If
pik happens to the policy currently proposed by pi, the result is returned to the application.
Intuitively, a controller blocking a tag τk may still be involved in installing τk+1 and thus we
cannot reuse τk for a policy other than pik. Otherwise, the slow controller may wake up and update
a port with an outdated rule. But since a slow or faulty controller can block at most one tag, there
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eventually must be at least one available tag in {0, . . . , f + 1} − {τk−1} when the first controller
performs its k-th nontrivial pull. In summary, we have the following result.
Theorem 4 ReuseTag solves the CPC Problem f -resiliently with tag complexity f + 2 using
f -resilient consensus objects.
A natural optimization of the ReuseTag algorithm is to allow a controller to broadcast the outcome
of each complete policy update. This way “left behind” controllers can catch up with the more
advanced ones, so that they do not need to re-install already installed policies.
Note that since in the algorithm, the controllers maintain a total order on the set of policy
updates that respects the order, we can easily extend it to encompass removals of previously
installed policies. To implement removals, it seems reasonable to assume that a removal request
for a policy pi is issued by the controller that has previously installed pi.
The tag complexity of ReuseTag is, in a strict sense, optimal. Indeed, we now show that there
exists no f -resilient CPC algorithm that uses f + 1 or less tags in any network. By contradiction,
for any such algorithm we construct a network consisting of two ingress ports connected to f
consecutive loops. We then consider f + 2 composable policies, pi1, . . . , pif+2, that have overlapping
domains but prescribe distinct paths. Given that only f + 1 tags are available, we can construct
an execution of the assumed algorithm in which one of f “slow but believed to faulty controllers”
wakes up and invalidates a more recently installed policy that uses the same tag, contradicting the
Consistency property of CPC. Thus:
Theorem 5 For each f ≥ 1, there exists a network such that any f -resilient CPC algorithm using
f -resilient consensus objects has tag complexity at least f + 2.
5 Related Work
Distributed Computing. There is a long tradition of defining correctness of a concurrent system
via an equivalence to a sequential one [12,15,17]. The notion of sequentially composable histories is
reminiscent of linearizability [12], where a history of concurrently applied operations is equivalent
to a history in which the operations are in a sequential order, respecting their real-time precedence.
Our sequentially composable histories impose requirements not only on high-level invocations and
responses, but also on the way the traffic is processed. We require that the committed policies
constitute a conflict-free sequential history, but, additionally, we expect that each packet trace is
consistent with a prefix of this history, containing all requests that were committed before the
packet was injected.
The transactional interface exported by the CPC abstraction is inspired by the work on specula-
tive concurrency control using software transactional memory (STM) [19]. Our interface is however
intended to model realistic network management operations, which makes it simpler than more
recent models of dynamic STMs [11].
Software Defined Networking. At the heart of Software-defined networking (SDN) lies the
decoupling of the system that makes decisions about where traffic is sent (the control plane) from
the underlying systems that forward traffic to the selected destination (the data plane). For an
introduction to SDN as well as for a discussion of the differences to concepts such as active networks
(where packets carry code and which are hard to formally verify) and protocols such as MPLS
(which do not come with a software control plane and which do not allow users to specify even
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basic consistency properties), we refer the reader to [4]. We believe that our distributed controller
can be used together with other link virtualization technologies which support tagging.
Onix [14] is among the earliest distributed SDN controller platforms. Onix applies existing
distributed systems techniques to build a Network Information Base (NIB), i.e., a data structure
that maintains a copy of the network state, and abstracts the task of network state distribution
from control logic. However, Onix expects developers to provide the logic that is necessary to detect
and resolve conflicts of network state due to concurrent control. In contrast, we study concurrent
policy composition mechanisms that can be leveraged by any application in a general fashion.
For the case of a single controller, Reitblatt et al. [18] formalized the notion of per-packet
consistency and introduced the problem of consistent network update. Mahajan and Watten-
hofer [16] introduced several new variants of network update problems, and presented more efficient,
dependency-based protocols. We complement this line of research by assuming a distributed com-
puting perspective, and by investigating robust and concurrent policy installations. Our work also
introduces the notion of tag complexity.
Bibliographic Note. In our SIGCOMM HotSDN workshop paper [3], we introduced the notion
of software transactional networking, and sketched a tag-based algorithm to consistently compose
concurrent network updates. However, the algorithm proposed there is not robust to any controller
failure, and features an exponential tag complexity. (A simple corollary of the present paper is that
the non-failure setting can be solved with two tags only.)
6 Concluding Remarks
We believe that our paper opens a rich area for future research, and we understand our work as a
first step towards a better understanding of how to design and operate a robust SDN control plane.
As a side result, our model allows us to gain insights into minimal requirements on the network that
enable consistent policy updates: e.g., in Appendix A, we prove that consistent network updates
are impossible if SDN ports do not support atomic read-modify-write operations.
Our FixTag and ReuseTag algorithms highlight the fundamental trade-offs between the con-
currency of installation of policy updates and the overhead on messages and switch memories.
Indeed, while being optimal in terms of tag complexity, ReuseTag essentially reduces to installing
updates sequentially. Our initial concerns were resilience to failures and overhead, so our definition
of the CPC problem did not require any form of “concurrent entry” [13]. But it is important to
understand to which extent the concurrency of a CPC algorithm can be improved, and we leave it
to future research.
Another direction for future research regards more complex, non-commutative policy compo-
sitions: while our protocol can also be used for, e.g., policy removals, it will be interesting to
understand how general such approaches are. We have also started to develop a proof-of-concept
prototype implementation of our distributed control plane [2].
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A Impossibility for Weaker Port Model
It turns out that SDN ports must support atomic policy updates (i.e., an atomic read-modify-
write); otherwise it is impossible to update a network consistently in the presence of even one crash
failure. Concretely, we assume here that a port can be accessed with two atomic operations: read
that returns the set of rules currently installed at the port and write that updates the state of the
port with a new set of rules.
Theorem 6 There is no solution to CPC using consensus objects that tolerates one or more crash
failures.
Proof. By contradiction and assume that there is a 1-resilient CPC algorithm A using consensus
objects.
Consider a network including two ingress ports, 1 and 2, initially configured to forward all the
traffic to internal ports (we denote this policy by pi0). Let processes p1 and p2 accept two policy-
update requests req1 = apply1(pi1) and req2 = apply2(pi2), respectively, such that pi1 is refined by pi2,
i.e., pr(pi2) > pr(pi1) and dom(pi2) ⊂ dom(pi1), and paths stipulated by the two policies to ingress
ports 1 and 2 satisfy pi
(1)
1 6= pi(1)2 and pi(2)1 6= pi(2)2 .
Now consider an execution of our 1-resilient algorithm in which p1 is installing pi1 and p2 takes
no steps. Since the algorithm is 1-resilient, p1 must eventually complete the update even if p2 is
just slow and not actually faulty. Let us stop p1 after it has configured one of the ingress ports,
say 1, to use policy pi1, and just before it changes the state of 2 to use policy pi1. Note that since
p1 did not witness a single step of p2 the configuration it is about to write to port 2 only contains
the composition of pi0 and pi1.
Now let a given packet in dom(pi1) arrive at port 1 and be processed according to pi1. We extend
the execution with p2 installing pi2 until both ports 1 and 2 are configured to use the composition
pi0 · pi1 · pi2. Such an execution exists, since the algorithm is 1-resilient and pi1 has been already
applied to one packet. Therefore, by sequential composability, the sequential equivalent of the
execution, both apply(pi1) and apply(pi1) must appear as committed.
But now we can schedule the enabled step of p1 to overwrite the state of port 2 with the
“outdated” configuration that does not contain pi2. From now on, every packet in dom(pi2) injected
at port 2 is going to be processed according to pi1—a contradiction to sequential composability. 
B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Theorem 3
The correctness of the algorithm is based on three simple arguments.
1. Global policy order: The strict port order ≺ guarantees that the equivalent sequential history
respects the total order of policy updates imposed by the ingress port of lowest order.
2. All-or-nothing semantics: A policy which started taking effect at some ingress ports will
eventually be installed at all ingress ports. This follows from the reliable broadcast imple-
mentation: the rebroadcasts ensure that eventually, all processes will learn about (and help
finish) the planned policy installation, even if the initiator failed before it notified the other
processes.
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3. Consistency: The proof of per-packet consistency is simple: a packet will be marked with an
immutable tag at its ingress port, and the tag defines a unique path in the network, consistent
with the corresponding policy.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 4
Termination: Consider any f -resilient execution E of ReuseTag and let pi1, pi2, . . . be the sequence
of policy updates as they appear in the linearization of the state-machine operations in E. Suppose,
by contradiction, that a given process pi never completes its policy update pi. Since our state-
machine PS is f -resilient, pi eventually completes its push(i, pi) operation. Assume pi has order k
in the total order on push operations. Thus, pi is blocked in processing some policy pi`, 1 ≤ ` ≤ k,
waiting in Lines 3 or 8.
Note that, by the Non-Triviality and Agreement properties of PS, when a correct process
completes installing pi`, eventually every other correct process completes installing pi`. Thus, all
correct processes are blocked while processing pi. Since there are at most f faulty processes, at most
f policies can be blocked forever. Moreover, since every blocked process has previously pushed a
policy update, the number of processes that try to pull proposed policy updates cannot exceed the
number of previously pushed policies. Therefore, by the Non-Triviality property of PS, eventually,
no correct process can be blocked forever in Line 3.
Finally, every correct process has previously completed installing policy with tag τ`−1. By the
algorithm, every injected packet is tagged with τ`−1 and, eventually, no packet with a tag other
than τ`−1 stays in the network. Thus, no correct process can be blocked in Line 8—a contradiction,
i.e., the algorithm satisfies the Termination property of CPC.
Consistency: To prove the Consistency property of CPC, let S be a sequential history that
respects the total order of policy updates determined by the PS. According to our algorithm, the
response of each update in S is ack if and only if it does not conflict with the set of previously
committed updates in S. Now since each policy update in S is installed by the two-phase update
procedure using atomic read-modify-write update operations, every packet injected to the network,
after a policy update completes, is processed according to the composition of the update with all
preceding updates. Moreover, an incomplete policy update that manages to push the policy into PS
will eventually be completed by some correct process (due to the reliable broadcast implementation).
Finally, the per-packet consistency follows from the fact that packets will always respect the global
order, and are marked with an immutable tag at the ingress port; the corresponding forwarding
rules are never changed while packets are in transit.
Thus, the algorithm satisfies the Consistency property of CPC.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 5
Assume the network Tf of two ingress ports A and B, and f + 1 “loops” depicted in Figure 3 and
consider a scenario in which the controllers apply a sequence of policies defined as follows. Let pii,
i = 1, . . . , f , denote a policy which, for each of the two ingress port, specifies a path that in every
loop ` 6= i takes the upper path and in loop i takes the lower path (the dashed line in Figure 3).
The policy pi0 specifies the paths that always go over the upper parts of all the loops (the dashed
line in Figure 3).
We assume that for any two policies pii and pij , such that 0 ≥ j < j ≥ f + 1, we have
pr(pii) > pr(pij) and dom(pii) ⊂ dom(pij), i.e., all these the policies are composable, and adding a
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new policy to the composition makes the composed policy more refined. Note that, assuming that
only policies pii, i = 0, . . . , f + 1, are in use, each of the ingress ports may only store one rule per
tag that forwards all the packets to the next branching port. Intuitively, the only way to make
sure that an injected packet is processed according to a new policy in the set is to equip injected
packets with specific tags and forward them further.
Suppose that 0 is the tag used for the initially installed pi0. By induction on i = 1, . . . , f +1, we
are going to show that any f -resilient CPC algorithm on Tf has a finite execution Ei at the end of
which (1) a composed policy pi0 · pi1 · · ·pii is installed and (2) there is a set of i processes, q1, . . . , qi,
such that each q`, ` = 1, . . . , i, is about to access an ingress port with an update operation that, if
the currently installed rule uses `− 1 to tag the injected packets, replaces it with a rule that uses
` instead.
For the base case i = 1, assume that p1 proposes to install pi1. Since the network initially carries
traffic tagged 0, the tag used for the composed policy pi0 ·pi1 must use a tag different from 0, without
loss of generality we call it 1. There exists an execution in which some process q1 has updated the
tag on one of the ingress port with tag 1 and is just about update the other port. Now we “freeze”
q1 and let another process to complete the update of the remaining ingress port. Such an execution
exists, since the protocol is f -resilient, assuming that f > 0 and, by the Consistency property of
CPC, any update that affected the traffic must be eventually completed. In the resulting execution
E1, q1 is about to update an ingress port to use tag 1 instead of 0 and the network operates
according to policy pi0 · pi1.
pii
...
loop f+1
...
loop i loop 1
ingress port B
ingress port A
pi0
Figure 3: The (f + 1)-loop network topology Tf .
Now take 1 < i ≤ f + 1 and, inductively, consider the execution Ei−1. Now suppose that some
process in Π − {q1, . . . , qi−1} proposes to install pii. Similarly, since the algorithm is f -resilient
(and, thus, (i − 1)-resilient), there is an extension of Ei−1 in which no process in {q1, . . . , qi−1}
takes a step after Ei−1 and eventually some process qi /∈ {q1, . . . , qi−1} updates one of the ingress
ports to apply pi0 · · ·pii so that instead of the currently used tag i− 1 a new tag τ is used. (By the
Consistency property of CPC, pii should be composed with all policies pi0, . . . , pii−1.)
Naturally, the new tag τ cannot be i− 1. Otherwise, while installing pi0 · · ·pii, either qi updates
port i before port i − 1 and some packet tagged i would have to take lower paths in both loops i
and i− 1 (which does not correspond to any composition of installed policies), or qi updates port
i− 1 before i and some packet would have to take no lower paths at all (which corresponds to the
policy pi0 later overwritten by pi0 · · ·pii−1).
Similarly, τ /∈ {0, . . . , i − 2}. Otherwise, once the installation of pi0 · · ·pii by qi is completed,
we can wake up process pt+1 that would replace the rule of tag τ with a rule using tag τ + 1, on
one of the ingress ports. Thus, every packet injected at the port would be tagged τ + 1. But this
would violate the Consistency property of CPC, because pi0 · · ·pii using tag τ is the most recently
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installed policy.
Thus, qi, when installing pi0 · · ·pii, must use a tag not in {0, . . . , i − 1}, say i. Now we let qi
freeze just before it is about to install tag i on the second ingress port it updates. Similarly, since
pi0 · · ·pii affected the traffic already on the second port, there is an extended execution in which
another process in Π− {q1, . . . , qi} completes the update and we get the desired execution Ei.
In Ef+1 exactly f + 2 tags are concurrently in use, which completes the proof.
16
